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Price elasticities of demand for credit are key parameters for intertemporal 
modeling, policy levers, and lending practice. On the modeling side, credit 
elasticities can shed light on liquidity constraints, returns to capital, and other 
elements of choice sets that drive elasticities of intertemporal substitution 
(Attanasio and Weber 2010). Such elasticities are key inputs for monetary and 
fiscal policies, as well as for micro-development policies. For example, 
policymakers and donors promoting financial development have variously 
encouraged microfinance financial institutions (MFIs) to cut rates to expand 
access under the assumption of elastic demand, or to raise rates to decrease 
reliance on subsidies under the assumption of inelastic demand (Rosenberg (2002)).  
Yet evidence on credit price elasticities is limited, particularly over longer 
time horizons. Long-run elasticities can differ from short-run elasticities for 
several reasons. On the borrower side, consumers may take time to learn about 
new rates, to adjust their choice sets (e.g., credit constraints may be less binding 
when borrowers have more time to search or plan), or to adjust their production 
functions (fixed costs become variable in the long-run). On the lender side, 
competitors may respond to a single lender’s price change, but not immediately 
(due, e.g., to menu costs, agency costs, and/or uncertainty about whether the first 
mover’s price change is temporary or permanent). 
We worked with Compartamos Banco, a for-profit, publicly-traded bank and 
the largest microlender2 in Mexico, to estimate price general-equilibrium, long-
run (as well as short-run) price elasticities by randomizing the interest rate offered 
                                                          
2
 Microlending is typically defined as the provision of small-dollar loans to (aspiring) 
entrepreneurs, although there is some policy and practitioner debate over the definition, 
see Karlan and Morduch (2009) and Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2010) for 
reviews. 
2
on its core group lending product, Credito Mujer
3
 Compartamos randomized at 
the level of 80 distinct geographic regions throughout Mexico, covering 130 field 
offices, thousands of borrowing groups, and tens of thousands of borrowers. 
“Treatment” branches implemented permanent 20 percentage point (pp) 
reductions in the annual interest rate (on a base of roughly 100% APR), while 
control branches implemented permanent 10pp reductions. We then estimate 
elasticities (and other treatment effects) using administrative data from 
Compartamos and credit bureaus over various horizons, for up to 29 months post-
treatment. These elasticities are identified under the assumption that the treatment 
did not induce differential supply-side changes; e.g., we assume that screening, 
monitoring, and marketing did not differ across treatment and control groups. The 
screening and monitoring assumptions are supported by the finding that the lower 
rate does not affect delinquency rates. The marketing assumption seems plausible 
given study protocols and the fact that both treatment and control regions 
experienced rate cuts (20pp vs. 10pp) relative to Compartamos’ prior rate. 
The research design here has some advantages compared to the most closely 
related prior studies. It allows more time for consumer learning and competitor 
response than the randomized direct mail studies used in Ausubel (1999) and 
Karlan and Zinman (2008). It uses non-subsidized and permanent price changes 
(see Bengtsson and Pettersson (2012) for evidence based on a transitory and 
subsidized zero interest rate). And our design uses randomized variation, over 
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many more geographic areas, than the quasi-experimental, 3-cluster design of 
Dehejia et al (2012).4 
We start by examining the extensive margin of demand, and find average 
elasticities (over the entire 29-month experiment) of loans taken out with respect 
to interest rates of around -1.4 in various specifications. We find some evidence 
that the lower interest rate attract new borrowers, irrespective of education and 
income, suggesting that lower prices may be effective at expanding access and not 
just for higher-income or -education individuals. This is an important result from 
a policy perspective, as depth of outreach to disadvantaged populations is an 
important consideration for regulators, donors and socially-motivated investors. 
We also find very elastic demand with respect to the amount borrowed (which 
combines extensive and intensive margins). The average price elasticity is around 
-1.9 in various specifications. Elasticities increase sharply in absolute value over 
time, from -1.1 for the first year post-price change to -2.9 for the third year.  
We address general equilibrium dynamics of the average elasticities in three 
ways. First, using credit bureau data, we examine how much of the increase in 
borrowing with Compartamos represents net new borrowing (vs. business-stealing 
from competitors) and find no evidence of crowd-out. (If anything, the point 
estimates suggest crowd-in.) Second, randomizing at the level of large geographic 
units (our 80 regions) internalizes any within-region feedback effects of price 
changes on supplier pricing, wages, etc. (However, we do not have any way of 
identifying whether and to what extent such feedback matters.) Third, we directly 
examine competitor offerings over a 20-month horizon and find no evidence that 
competitors responded differentially in Compartamos’ lower-rate areas.  
                                                          
4
 Other quasi-experimental studies include Gross and Souleles (2002) on credit cards in 
the United States, Alessie et al (2005) on consumer loans in Italy, and Attanasio et al 
(2008) on auto loans in the United States. 
4
Why don’t competitors respond if demand is elastic? A null effect on 
Compartamos’ profits provides a piece of the puzzle. Delinquency does not fall 
significantly at lower rates, although our confidence intervals do not rule out 
economically significant reductions that would be consistent with lower rates 
(further) mitigating information asymmetries. 5  The bank’s other costs for 
treatment areas—namely, operating costs-- rose significantly and offset any 
increase in gross interest income.6 In all, the results suggest that multiple pricing 
equilibria are possible and sustainable.
7
  
Summarizing our key results, we find that long-run demand is price elastic, 
with elasticities growing over time and no evidence of crowd-out. Lower prices 
bring in substantial numbers of new borrowers, and not differentially with respect 
to income or education. But the lower rates do not increase profits, as the costs of 
servicing additional clients offset any increase in revenues. Competitors do not 
respond to Compartamos’ lower prices. Overall, we find that Compartamos has 
sustainably served more clients by cutting rates, at no cost to shareholders. 
 
  
                                                          
5
 See also Karlan and Zinman (2009), which finds evidence of substantial information 
asymmetries in individual liability consumer lending in South Africa. 
6
 It is possible that the increased number of clients has led to increased profits from cross-
sells, but we lack data to estimate that effect.  
7
 To be clear, we cannot test precisely for multiple equilibria: there may be one 
equilibrium in between the two points we test where our two points are simply equivalent 
in terms of profit but not actually equilibria; there may be a continuum of equilibria that 
contain both of the two points we test; there may be truly two (or more) unique equilibria, 
at the two points we tested (or more); or, it may simply be that despite the large shift in 
revenue between our two points, the empirical precision on profits is too noisy to isolate 
the precise equilibrium. 
5
I. The Market Setting 
A. Compartamos and its Target Market 
The lender, Compartamos Banco, is the largest microlender in Mexico with 
2.3 million borrowers.
8
 Compartamos was founded in 1990 as a nonprofit 
organization, converted to a commercial bank in 2006, went public in 2007, and 
has a market capitalization of US$2.2 billion as of November 16
th
, 2012. As of 
2012, 71% of Compartamos clients borrow through Crédito Mujer, the group 
microloan product studied in this paper.  
Crédito Mujer nominally targets women that have a business or self-
employment activity or intend to start one. Empirically, 100% of borrowers are 
women, but a companion paper uses survey data to estimate that only about 52% 
are “microentrepreneurs” (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2013). Borrowers tend 
to lack the income and/or collateral required to qualify for loans from banks and 
other “upmarket” lenders. Below we provide additional information on marketing, 
group formation, and screening. 
 
B. Loan Terms 
Crédito Mujer loan amounts range from M$900-M$24,000 pesos (13 pesos, 
denoted M$, = $1US), with larger amounts subsequently available to members of 
groups that have successfully repaid prior loans.
9
 Loan repayments are due over 
16 equal weekly installments, and are guaranteed by the group (i.e., joint 
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 Also, beginning in weeks 3 to 9 of the second loan cycle, clients in good standing can 
take out an additional, individual liability loan, in an amount up to 30% of their joint 
liability loan. 
6
liability). Aside from these personal guarantees there is no collateral. Interest rates 
are marketed as monthly, “add-on” rates of 3.0-4.5%, excluding value-added tax 
and forced simultaneous savings.
10
 This pricing sits roughly in the middle of the 




C. Targeting, Marketing, Group Formation, and Screening
12
 
Crédito Mujer groups range in size from 10 to 50 members. When 
Compartamos enters a new market loan officers typically target self-reported 
female entrepreneurs and promote the Credito Mujer product through diverse 
channels, including door-to-door promotion, distribution of fliers in public places, 
radio, promotional events, etc. As loan officers gain more clients in new areas, 
they promote less frequently and rely more on clients to recruit other members. 
When a group of about five women – half of the minimum required group size 
– expresses interest, a loan officer visits the partial group at one of their homes or 
businesses to explain loan terms and process. These initial women are responsible 
                                                          
10
 An add-on rate is calculated over the original loan amount and does not adjust for 
declining balances as an Annual Percentage Rate (APR) does. Borrowers must make an 
upfront deposit totaling 10% of their loan amount into a personal savings account, and 
contribute at least 10 pesos weekly for the remainder of the loan cycle. This “forced 
savings” component at either zero or low interest is not claimed as collateral, but rather 
meant to instill a “culture of regular deposits” and generate a signal of the client’s ability 
to generate and manage cash flow that can be used to evaluate creditworthiness for future 
loans. The forced savings is not necessarily held by Compartamos; i.e., the effective APR 
paid by the borrower may be higher than the effective APR earned by Compartamos. 
Mexican law does not require advertisements or disclosures to include the forced savings 
or value-added tax in APR calculations. 
11
 See http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2011/02/compartamos-in-context.php for more 
details on microloan pricing in Mexico. Among other things, there does not seem to be 
clear relationship between lender ownership status (for-profit vs. Non-profit) and 
effective APRs. 
12
 This sub-section also appears in Angelucci et al (2013). 
7
for finding the rest of the group members. The loan officer returns for a second 
visit to explain loan terms in greater detail and complete loan applications for 
each individual. All potential members must be older than 18 years and also 
present a proof of address and valid identification to qualify for a loan. Business 
activities (or plans to start one) are not verified; rather, Compartamos relies on 
group members to screen out any uncreditworthy applicants. In equilibrium, 
potential members who apply are rarely screened out by their fellow members, 
since individuals who would not get approved are not recruited and do not to tend 
to seek out membership. 
Compartamos reserves the right to reject any applicant put forth by the group 
but relies heavily on the group’s endorsement. Compartamos does pull a credit 
report for each individual and automatically rejects anyone with a history of 
fraud. Beyond that, loan officers do not use the credit bureau information to reject 
clients, as the group has responsibility for deciding who is allowed to join.  
Applicants who pass Compartamos’ screens are invited to a loan authorization 
meeting. Each applicant must be guaranteed by every other member of the group 
to get a loan. Loan amounts must also be agreed upon unanimously. Loan officers 
moderate the group’s discussion, and sometimes provide information on credit 
history and assessments of individuals’ creditworthiness. Proceeds from 
authorized loans are disbursed as checks to each client. 
 
D. Group Administration, Loan Repayment, and Collection Actions  
Each group elects a treasurer who collects payments, from each group 
member, at each weekly meeting. The loan officer is present to facilitate and 
monitor but does not touch the money. If a group member does not make her 
weekly payment, the President (and loan officer) will typically solicit and 
8
encourage “solidarity” pooling to cover the payment and keep the group in good 
standing. All payments are placed in a plastic bag that Compartamos provides, 
and the Treasurer then deposits the group’s payment at either a nearby bank 
branch or convenience store.
13
 
Beyond the group liability, borrowers have several other incentives to repay. 
Members of groups with arrears are not eligible for another loan until the arrears 
are cured. Members of groups that remain in good standing qualify for larger 
subsequent loan amounts and lower interest rates. Compartamos also reports 
individual repayment history for each borrower to the Mexican Official Credit 
Bureau. Loans that are more than 90 days in arrears after the end of the loan term 
are sent to collection agencies. 
Late payments are common, but default is rare: in our data, we find a 90-day 
group delinquency rate of 9.8%, but the ultimate default rate is only about 1%. 
 
II. Study Design 
The research team (IPA) worked with Compartamos to identify 80 distinct 
geographic areas (“regions” for the purpose of the study), throughout Mexico, for 
the purpose of randomly assigning interest rates (Figure 1). The Compartamos 
operating unit within a region is a “branch” (actually more like a regional or sub-
regional office); the mean number of branches per region is 1.65. IPA then 
assigned each of the 80 regions (and all branches within each region) to either 
“low rate” or “high rate”. The interest rates applied only to Compartamos’ core 
                                                          
13
 Compartamos has partnerships with six banks (and their convenience stores) and two 
separate convenience stores. The banks include Banamex (Banamexi Aquí), Bancomer 
(Pitico), Banorte (Telecomm and Seven Eleven), HSBC, Scotiabank, and Santander. The 
two separate convenience stores are Oxxo and Chedraui.  
9
group lending product. Compartamos did not bundle any additional operational or 
strategic changes across high- vs. low-rate regions, so any responses we observe 
are demand-driven, pure price effects.  
Figure 1. Randomized Pricing by Study Region 
 
The motivation for randomizing at the region level, as opposed to a more 
granular level like branches or groups, is twofold. The first is to allow for any 
consumer learning and competitive response to take place at the level of a 
geographic market; i.e., we allow for within-market spillovers. Second, region-
level assignment facilitates compliance with the randomization in a group lending 
setting, by ensuring that contiguous groups or contiguous branches (which would 
 “high” rate 
 “low” rate 
10
normally draw some borrowers from overlapping geographic areas) are assigned 
the same rate.  
Table 1 summarizes various baseline (April 2007) averages for low-rate and 
high-rate regions, and checks for balance on these observables. Panel A covers 
borrower characteristics: education, age, number of children, number of 
dependents, and marital status. Panel B covers loan volume, both to all borrowers 
and to groups targeted by some policymakers, MFIs, and donors (new borrowers 
and those with low education; we also consider relatively poor borrowers below 
but lack pre-treatment data on income or wealth). Panel C covers loan 
characteristics: APR, loan amount, group size, and number of groups. 
Delinquency data is absent here because we lack the requisite data pre-treatment. 
Panel D covers region characteristics, focusing on Compartamos' market share as 
measured using credit bureau data. Overall, Table 1 suggests that the 
randomization is valid: we find no more significant differences across low-rate 
and higher-rate regions than one would expect to find by chance. 
The experiment engineered prices that were about 10 percentage points lower 
(in APR units) in “low rate” regions (Table 2 Panel A). Starting May 15, 2007, 
Compartamos implemented this variation by offering differential cuts from pre-
treatment prices. Low-rate regions got 20 percentage point cuts from pre-
treatment rates (which averaged about 100% APR, as shown in Table 1 Panel C). 
High-rate regions got 10 percentage point cuts.14 Compartamos presented these 
prices to (prospective) borrowers as “permanent” in the sense of the “new 
                                                          
14
 Compartamos advertises and administers interest rates in add-on, monthly terms, and 
prices each group into one of three tiers based on past performance. So the randomization 
assigned low-rate regions to tiered pricing of 3.0%/3.5%/4.0% monthly, and high-rate 
regions to 3.5%/4.0%/4.5% monthly. We convert these monthly rates to balance-
weighted APRs.  
11
normal”: these were not promotional rates. The bank has kept these rates in place 
permanently in all study branches.  
We measure price sensitivities by comparing various outcome measures in 
low- vs. high-rate regions for up to 29-months post-“treatment” (i.e, post- 
differential rate cuts). In some cases we can use pre-treatment data as well. The 
next section details our specifications and results.  
 
III. Empirical Specifications and Results 
A. Simple Means Comparisons Preview Many of the Key Results 
Table 2, Panels B-D shows simple means comparisons for key first-order (i.e., 
Compartamos) outcomes. Each column reports an estimated difference (and its 
standard error) between the mean region in the treatment (low-rate) group and the 
mean region in the control (higher-rate) group. Columns 1-5 report differences at 
six-month increments post-treatment, and Column 6 covers the entire post-
treatment period. Since stocks change more slowly than flows, we focus on flows. 
So, e.g., Panel B Column 1 counts loans disbursed during the sixth post-treatment 
month. We report only differences due to space constraints, but Table 1 shows 
many of the pre-treatment levels. 
Table 2's findings preview many of our regression results, and differ from our 
regressions only in that the simple means comparisons use less information: fewer 
post-treatment months, and no pre-treatment months. 
Panel B, which counts loans disbursed, shows several key patterns. First, we 
see almost uniformly positive point estimates, suggesting that the lower rate does 
produce more borrowers. Second, we see almost uniformly elastic point 
12
elasticities. Third, the point estimates and elasticities get larger over time (reading 
from Column 1 to Column 5). Fourth, they are more likely to be significantly 
different from zero in the later periods (Columns 4 and 5). Fifth, the low rate 
produces new borrowers— those had never borrowed from Compartamos 
before— strongly and significantly in both the later periods and over the full post-
treatment period. The point estimates are consistent with elastic responses by 
other commonly targeted groups— low-education and poorer borrowers—but 
results for these groups are imprecise, and not statistically different from high 
education and wealthier borrowers.15  
Panel C shows similar patterns for loan amounts disbursed. 
Panel D shows results for delinquencies. We would expect the lower rate to 
reduce delinquencies if there are information asymmetries (see Karlan and 
Zinman (2009) for a discussion and experiment to identify such effects). This 
might be particularly true for new groups or groups comprised of primarily new 
members, if screening is more difficult without a prior transaction history. Note 
that base level of delinquency is in fact high enough for interest rates to have a 
potentially meaningful effect on the margin: the post-treatment period control 
group averages are 14% for any lateness, and for 10% more than 90 days late. We 
do not find robust evidence of a delinquency elasticity with respect to interest 
rates, although most of the point estimates are negative.  
Panel E shows positive but imprecisely estimated increases in interest income. 
Costs increase by about the same amount in point terms, but are more precisely 
                                                          
15
 In a given month, we define a loan to a new borrower as one disbursed to someone who 
had not borrowed from Compartamos in any previous month. We measure educational 
attainment for each borrower using Compartamos application data. We measure poverty 
likelihood (Schreiner 2006) for each borrower using application data that Compartamos 
starting collecting in June 2007. 
13
estimated and hence significantly different from zero. The effects on profits are 
imprecisely estimated zeros. Are accounting definitions of income, costs, and 
profits are standard, and detailed in the table notes. 
 
B. Regression Specifications, and Results on Elasticities of Loans Disbursed 
We use our analysis of loans disbursed—i.e., of loans taken out, the extensive 
margin of loan demand—to introduce our main empirical specifications. These 
regressions augment the simple means comparisons presented in Table 2 by 
controlling for pre-treatment data and secular time effects to improve the 
precision of the estimates. We do this using three different OLS specifications: 
(1) Yrt =  + 1(LowRater*Postt) + R + T +  
Y is an outcome (here the flow of loans disbursed), measured for region r in 
month-year t.  is the constant. The variable of interest here is the interaction 
term—which equals one if and only if the observation is from a low-rate region in 
the post-treatment period—and 
1
 identifies price sensitivity. R is a vector of 
dummies—fixed effects—for each region, and  is the vector of coefficients on 
these fixed effects. R absorbs the LowRate main effect: treatment status does not 
change within-region once the experiment starts. T is a vector of month-year 
dummies (e.g., separate dummies for June 2007 and June 2009), and these absorb 
the Post main effect.  is the error term. Throughout the paper we cluster standard 
errors at the unit of randomization, i.e., the region. 
For most outcomes we lack more than two months of pre-treatment data, so 
the region fixed effects are not necessarily well-identified. Hence we also 
estimate: 
14
(2) Yrt =  + 2(LowRater*Postt) + LowRater + T +  
The only change from (1) is that we replace the region fixed effects with the 
LowRate dummy.  
Our third specification uses only post-treatment observations, but controls 
flexibly for pre-treatment outcomes: 
(3) Yrt =  + 3(LowRater) + Yrp + T +  
Here 
3
 is the coefficient of interest, and Y
p
 is a vector of variables, one for each 
pre-treatment observation. E.g., for loans disbursed, we have two months of pre-
treatment data for each region. So for each post-treatment observation (i.e, for 
each Yrt), Y
p
 is comprised of the same two variables and values for that region r: 
loans disbursed in March 2007, and loans disbursed in April 2007.  
The price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in quantity 
demanded divided by the percentage change in price. We calculate the former, for 
each specification, by dividing the coefficient of interest by the mean of Yrt across 
all high-rate (control-group) regions, over the entire post-treatment period. We 
calculate the latter, again over the entire post-treatment period, by dividing the 
average, balance-weighted APR difference between high- and low-rate regions, 
and then dividing that difference by the average, balance-weighted APR in high-
rate regions. 
As noted at the outset, we are able to identify price elasticities of demand 
under the assumption of no impact on supply-side decisions as a result of 
treatment. For example, it must be the case that the 20pp interest rate cut does not 
induce differential screening or monitoring than the 10pp rate cut. Our finding 
that delinquencies are not affected by the interest rate (see below) supports this 
assumption. It must also be the case that treatment and control regions did not 
15
receive different marketing (if marketing affects demand); this assumption seems 
reasonable given the study protocols (no operational changes other than price), 
and the fact that both treatment and control regions experienced rate cuts relative 
to Compartamos’ prior rates.
16
 
Table 3 presents results on the price sensitivity of loans taken out for each of 
specifications (1), (2), and (3). In each case the variable of interest shows a 
statistically significant increase of 190 to 200 loans disbursed per month in the 
low-rate regions, compared to the high rate regions. The implied elasticities 
(shown near the bottom of the table) are -1.3 or -1.4. 
Table 3 Columns 4-6 show that interest rate sensitivity increases over time, 
parameterized categorically (year-to-year). For this analysis we replace the 
variable estimating a single treatment effect with three interaction terms, one each 
for months 1-12, 13-24, and 25-29 post-treatment (with no omitted category, so 
each interaction identifies the price response for its time window). We see 
treatment effects rising from one year to the next (and cannot reject linearity) in 
level terms. The table also reports p-values showing that these effects are 
significantly different from year-to-year. The elasticities increase as well: from 
about -0.8 in year one to -1.5 in year two to -2.2 in year three. The finding that 
elasticities increase over time is consistent with borrower learning and/or 
adjustment costs. Appendix table 1 finds lower point elasticities using log of 
quantity of loans disbursed instead of the levels used in Table 3; e.g., -1.2 in the 
full sample, and -1.75 in year three. The results using logs are also less precise. 
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 For example, suppose that any substantial price change triggers informative 
advertising. In that case both our treatment and control regions would get the additional 
advertising, because both sets of regions got price cuts relative to Compartamos’ prior 
rates. 
16
C. Do Lower Rates Improve “Outreach”? 
Next we explore whether the lower interest rate increased take-up by groups 
that are often the focus of “outreach” intended to expand access to microcredit: 
new borrowers (Table 4a), those with less education (Table 4b), and the 
(relatively) poor (Table 4c).
17
 We re-estimate the specifications used in Table 3, 
with loans disbursed to one of the three groups as the dependent variable. 
The results for new borrowers over the full study period (Table 4a Columns 1-
3) show positive point estimates on the interest rate variables of interest that 
imply point elasticities in the -0.9 to -1.3 range. But the results are a bit imprecise, 
with p-values ranging from 0.13 to 0.27. Further down the table we report p-
values for tests of whether interest rate sensitivity is significantly different for 
new versus retained clients: it is not, although two of the p-values are 0.13 and 
0.15. Columns 4-6 show some evidence that new-client elasticities increase over 
time, as in the full sample (Table 3). These columns suggest new borrowers 
become increasingly responsive to the lower rate over time: the year 3 treatment 
effect is significant with 90% confidence in each specification, and significantly 
different than the other years’ treatment effects. The Year 3 treatment effect 
implies an elasticity of new borrowers with respect to price of between -1.7 and -
2.0 depending on specification. These columns also show that, by Year 3, interest 
rate sensitivity is significantly different for new versus retained clients. New 
clients are less sensitive (although only slightly so in elasticity units); we do not 
actually show the magnitude of the difference in the table to conserve space, but 
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 Recapping our definitions from Section III-A and Tables 1 and 2: in a given month, we 
define a loan to a new borrower as one disbursed to someone who had not borrowed from 
Compartamos in any previous month. We measure educational attainment for each 
borrower using Compartamos application data. We measure poverty likelihood for each 
borrower using application data that Compartamos starting collecting in June 2007. The 
poverty score formula is from Schreiner (2006). 
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show the comparable results for retained clients in Appendix table 2 for 
comparison. 
Table 4b shows a similar pattern of results, with slightly lower but still elastic 
point elasticities, for lower-education borrowers. Columns 1-3 suggest unit 
elasticity on average for this group. Columns 4-6 show statistically significant 
year 3 elasticities of about -1.7. We do not find significantly different price 
sensitivities for lower-education versus higher-education borrowers, although 
Appendix table 3 shows that the point elasticities are much larger in absolute 
value for the higher-education group. 
Table 4c shows a limited set of results for loans disbursed to relatively poor 
borrowers: those with poverty likelihood >= 50%. We lack pre-treatment data on 
poverty likelihood, so we can only estimate a version of equation (3) that does not 
control for pre-treatment outcomes. Column 1 shows an imprecisely estimated 
unit elasticity. Column 2 shows higher but imprecisely estimated point elasticities 
in years 2 and 3 than in year 1. We do not find significant differences in price 
sensitivity between low- and high-income borrowers, although Appendix table 4 
shows that the point elasticities are much larger in absolute value for the higher-
income group. 
 
D.  Full Sample Results on Elasticities of Amount Borrowed from Compartamos 
Table 5 presents estimates of price sensitivities of the amount lent by 
(borrowed from) Compartamos, again measured as region-month flows. This 
measure of demand combines the extensive and intensive margins.  
Columns 1-3 show a similar overall response to what we found for loans 
disbursed in Table 3. Each specification shows a statistically significant increase 
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of about two million pesos per month in lower-rate compared to higher-rate 
regions. Point elasticities are in the -1.85 to -1.91 range. Columns 4-6 estimate 
separate treatment effects and elasticities for each year post-treatment, and again 
show that price sensitivity increases over time: each of the yearly treatment 
effects are significantly different from each other. Each of the nine yearly 
elasticities is also significantly different from zero with at least 95% confidence. 
The Year 1 elasticities range from -1.09 to -1.18. The Year 2 elasticities range 
from -1.93 to -1.99. The Year 3 elasticities range from -2.86 to -2.91.  
Appendix table 5 estimates the same specifications with log(loan amount) 
instead of level. The point elasticities are somewhat lower (about -1.7 in the full 
sample, and -2.4 in year three), and less precisely estimated. 
 
E. Rate Cuts in Equilibrium: Evidence on Net Elasticities from Credit Bureaus 
Credit bureau data enable us to examine another important aspect of general 
equilibrium responses to interest rate changes (besides the time-varying 
elasticities estimated in Tables 3-5): net elasticities that take into account any 
crowd-out or crowd-in of credit from other lenders. We have data from two 
bureaus: the Mexican Official Credit Bureau and the Circulo. Both bureaus allow 
us to focus only on loans that are comparable to Compartamos’ loans.18  The 
Official Bureau has more comprehensive coverage (compare the means in 
Column 1 and 2 in Table 6), but has the disadvantage of including Compartamos 
loans in the region-level data we were able to obtain.19 The Circulo Bureau has the 
                                                          
18
 We include the following lending institution types: Bank, Bank loan PFAE, Credit line 
from bank, Non bank loan for PFAE, Financial non-bank loan for PFAE, Personal 
finance company, Medium market commerice, Medium market NF service, and Credit 
Union.  
19
 The credit bureaus would only provide us with data at the level of the 
municipality*lending institution type. So we cannot identify individual lenders or 
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advantages of including Azteca, a main competitor of Compartamos, and of 
excluding Compartamos loans.20 
The bureau data (Table 6) has three main differences from the Compartamos 
data used to estimate our main results on elasticities of demand for Compartamos 
debt (Tables 3-5). First, we were only able to obtain two snapshots from the 
bureaus: April 2007 (one month before the start of the pricing experiment), and 
December 2008. In all we have data from 79 regions at both points in time, for a 
total of 158 region-month observations. As such, Table 6 reports estimates from 
equation (2) only. Second, the Official Bureau data lacks loan amounts and the 
number of borrowers, so our main measure of aggregate demand is the number of 
loans. Third, the credit bureau captures stocks, not flows. Given these differences, 
Table 6 Column 3 also reports a comparable estimate for the stock of 
Compartamos loans measured from Compartamos’ data, using the same two 
months (April 2007 and December 2008), and the same specification. There is a 
marginally significant treatment effect of about 800 loans in the Compartamos 
data, with an implied elasticity of -1.6. 
The main inference we can make from the credit bureau data is a lack of 
strong evidence for crowd-out. Focusing on the Circulo (column 1), because this 
excludes Compartamos loans, we see a positive point estimate on 
Post*InterestRate, with a p-value of 0.16, suggesting that crowd-in is more likely 
than crowd-out (Angelucci et al 2013 also finds some evidence that Compartamos 
lending increases generate crowd-in). Column 2 (from the Official Bureau) also 
                                                                                                                                                              
borrowers. To aggregate to regions we exclude the 3% of municipalities that straddle our 
regional boundaries, and the 16.5% of municipalities with <20 Compartamos clients. The 
latter exclusion improves power by focusing on the parts of regions where Compartamos 
actually has a presence (regions are large enough that Compartamos does not necessarily 
operate throughout the entire region). 
20
 Another difference between the two credit bureaus is that the Circulo enables us to 
filter on loan type rather than lender type: we count only “Personal Loans”. 
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shows a large, positive point estimate that is much larger than the direct effect on 
Compartamos borrowing (compare to Column 3), but this point estimate is 
imprecisely estimated as well (p-value 0.2). 
 
F. Does Delinquency Fall with Price? 
We now turn to an analysis of whether the lower interest rate was profitable 
for Compartamos, starting with an examination of whether the lower rate affected 
loan delinquency (Table 7). As widely theorized, and tested experimentally in 
Karlan and Zinman (2009), interest rates can have a causal effect on loan 
repayments through multiple channels: asymmetric information (adverse selection 
and/or moral hazard), and/or an income effect under liquidity constraints. We also 
examine whether interest rates have delinquency effects that vary with measures 
of the prevalence of new borrowers in a region-month, under the hypothesis that 
any asymmetric information problem may be relatively severe for borrowers who 
have not contracted with Compartamos before. Our outcome of interest here is the 
proportion of groups, in a region-month, that are behind on their repayments. 
(Appendix table 6 reports estimates where the unit of observation is the group-
month instead of the region-month. We find similar results.)  
Our empirical models and sample are the same as for demand estimation, with 
three exceptions. First, Compartamos did not track delinquency systematically 
prior to the experiment, so we lack pre-treatment data and the ability to estimate 
equations (1) and (2). Instead, our estimator here is equation (3) sans the controls 
for pre-treatment outcomes. Second, we count only groups that could possibly be 
late in the denominator; i.e., we exclude groups that are too new to be delinquent. 
For the serious delinquency measure this excludes 163 region-months that are 
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comprised entirely of groups with loans disbursed in the previous four months. 
Third, we omit specifications that allow for time-varying effects.
21
  
Table 7 Columns 1-3 examine moderate delinquency--any lateness—and 
show little evidence of price response. The point estimates are all negative, 
however (consistent with lower rates mitigating asymmetric information), and the 
confidence intervals do not rule out economically meaningful effect sizes relative 
to the base rates at the region-month level, which are 0.14 for all groups, 0.15 for 
groups with >75% new members, and 0.19 for new groups. Columns 4-6 show a 
similar pattern of results for severe delinquency: >90 days. Again the point 
estimates are all negative, with confidence intervals that contain large effects 
relative to the base rates of 0.10 to 0.16. 
 
G. Rate Cuts in Equilibrium: Are They Profitable/Sustainable for Compartamos?  
Another key question for equilibrium is whether the lower interest rate was 
profitable, or at least sustainable, for Compartamos. Table 8 reports estimates, 
using equation (3), of how the lower interest rates affected Compartamos’ interest 
income, costs, and profits. Appendix table 7 shows that we find similar results 
from our other two specifications. 
Table 8 Column 1 shows an imprecisely estimated increase in interest income 
over the entire post-treatment period (note that any effect on delinquencies is 
nested here). The point estimates in Column 2 suggest that the effect on income 
increases over time. 
                                                          
21
 Results available upon request; we find no evidence of time-varying effects. 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 show a similar but more precisely estimated 
pattern for total operating costs (note that any effect on chargeoffs is nested here). 
The point estimates are all positive— the lower interest rate increases costs as 
well as revenues—and a bit smaller than the point estimates for revenues. 
Appendix table 8 suggests that about half of the cost increase is due to personnel. 
Appendix table 9 shows that costs fall in the average number of members per 
group, and increase with the number of groups. Appendix table 10 shows some 
evidence that lower rate regions increase groups and group size (Column 1-4), but 
that loan officers do not handle significantly more groups or clients. In all, we 
find little evidence of economies of scale given current operations and firm 
structure. Innovations with respect to lending technology, such as mobile devices 
with customized software for credit officers (that are being implemented by many 
lenders, including Compartamos), may help lower marginal costs and capture 
economies of scale in the future. 
Table 8 Columns 5 and 6 show null effects on profits (unsurprising given the 
previous columns, and note that the treatment effects do not add up perfectly due 
to the inclusion of control variables). The year-three point estimates hint the lower 
rate might be profitable in the (very) long-run, as the elasticity increases over 
time. But the confidence intervals also include large negative effects on profits: 
the results are imprecise.  
So why had not Compartamos cut interest rates earlier? After all, given profit-
neutrality, elastic demand, and a “double bottom line” of helping clients to 
“generate social and economic value”, as well as the possibility of increased 
cross-sells, the lower rate interest has turned out to be beneficial for Compartamos 
ex-post. We speculate that costly experimentation may discourage some lenders 
from deriving their demand curves. In addition to direct costs, there may be a risk 
to cutting rates if demand curves develop kinks at current market rates that make 
23
subsequent increases quite costly.
22
 We discuss some implications of costly 
experimentation for market equilibria and future research in the Conclusion. 
 
H. Rate Cuts in Equilibrium: Evidence on Competitors’ (Non-)Responses 
Our last bit of evidence on the general equilibrium effects of Compartamos’ 
pricing changes comes from some standard market research on competitors’ 
offerings. We worked with Compartamos’ senior management to lay out some 
simple protocols for the bank’s field staff to gather data on interest rates and loan 
terms: 1) collect data for at least the three top competitors in each region; 2) 
collect data by having someone pose as a prospective client seeking a 4,000 peso 
loan (a typical loan size for a new microcredit client); 3) collect data at two points 
in time, first in May 2007 (just prior to the start of the study), and then one at least 
one year after the start of the experiment (although some branch managers 
reported back as early as April 2008); 4) collect data on the same competitors in 
the pre- and post-periods, and also on new competitors in the post-period as 
merited by any changes in the competitive environment. 19 of 73 regions 
reporting in both periods reported a constant set of competitors.23 The number of 
competitors ranged from 1 to 10, with a mean of 3.12.  
Table 9 presents estimates of whether and how competitors respond to 
Compartamos’ lower interest rate. Given only two observations per region, we 
                                                          
22
 Karlan and Zinman (2008) finds extremely elastic demand to rates increases but not 
decreases, an asymmetry the lender there had anticipated. 
23
 Two regions did not provide post-treatment competitor rates, three regions did not 
provide pre-treatment competitor rates, and two regions did not have any branches 
operating in the pre-treatment period.  
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estimate equation (2), in some cases adding controls for maturity (a cubic, in 
weeks). In Columns 1-8 the dependent variable is equal to the average or lowest 
competitor APR in the region. We vary whether we use the full sample of 152 
competitor pricing observations, restrict the sample to competitors captured in 
both the baseline and follow-up (this drops 10 of the 152 observations), or further 
restrict to competitors with the same loan maturity in both baseline and follow-up 
(this drops 54 of the 152 observations). 
The results paint the same picture regardless of specification: all eight 
estimates for the effect of Post*LowRate on competitor APRs are positive, 
suggesting that if anything competitors respond to Compartamos’ lower rate by 
raising prices. We also test the hypothesis that competitors match Compartamos’ 
lower rate (i.e., that Post*LowRate = -10), and we reject that hypothesis with 90% 
confidence in five out of the eight specifications (p-values reported in the bottom 
row of the table). We do not find any effects on competitor counts either 
(Columns 9 and 10).  
Why don’t competitors follow Compartamos’ rate cut if demand is elastic? The 
simplest answer is that it would not change profits (it did not for Compartamos: 
recall Table 8). And if our inference from the credit bureau data is correct—no 
crowd-out of borrowing from competitors (crowd-in if anything)—then 
competitors did not feel the consequences of Compartamos’ lower rates on their 
own revenues, either. 
Why don’t borrowers substitute away from competitors (again recall the lack 
of crowd-out in Table 6) if Compartamos offers lower prices and the competitors 
do not? One possibility is product differentiation. Another is search and/or switch 
costs. Yet another is liquidity constraints: if borrowers had excess demand at pre-
treatment market rates, they might borrow more on the margin, from 
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Compartamos, without reducing their inframarginal borrowing. Crowd-in can 
result if there are both liquidity constraints and non-convexities in investment 
Banerjee and Newman (1993). 
 
IV. Conclusion  
We study the long-run (up to 29-month) effects of a 10% interest rate 
reduction by the largest microlender in Mexico, using a field experiment 
implemented at the level of 80 distinct geographic regions. Demand for 
Compartamos loans is quite elastic, and gets more so over time. For example, the 
average elasticity of amount borrowed over the 29 months is about -1.9, with a 
year one elasticity of about -1.1, and a year three (month 25-29) elasticity of about 
-2.9. There is no strong evidence of crowd-out in credit bureau data. The lower 
rate is profit-neutral for Compartamos, and the bank has maintained the lower rate 
post-experiment, confirming that the lower rate has been sustainable for 
Compartamos. We find no evidence that competitors responded by cutting rates. 
These findings suggest several avenues for future research. First, 
understanding why elasticities grow over time—e.g., the relative importance of 
learning versus adjustment costs—is important for modeling and policy analysis. 
A closely related line of inquiry would unpack relationships between elasticities 
of demand for credit and for saving. Estimates of the elasticities of demand for 
savings range as low as zero (Hall 1988; Karlan and Zinman 2012), and most are 
strictly below the elasticities we find here.  
There is also much to learn about microlending production functions as well. 
Our results suggest an absence of commonly-assumed economies of scale, and it 
would be useful to know what prevents Compartamos (and, presumably, other 
microlenders) from capturing scale economies. Is it something inherent to the 
26
group lending model? Labor market frictions? A longer transition path to scale 
economies than our study window; i.e., perhaps it takes time to re-optimize fixed 
costs to handle the increased loan volume? 
Obtaining more precise estimates of aggregate credit demand and net 
elasticities is also important. Our finding of no crowd-out even though 
competitors do not price-match raises possibilities that switch costs have big 
effects on market outcomes, and/or that liquidity constraints work in surprising 
ways: the standard story is that liquidity constraints make agents price-inelastic, 
but perhaps this is true only of responses to price increases.  
The possibility of asymmetric responses to price increases and decreases 
raises another possibility that fits with our results: multiple equilibria borne of 
costly experimentation along the profit-maximizing frontier. Holding profits 
constant (as turned out to the case in our experiment), a lower interest rate would 
seem to be at least weakly better for a lender like Compartamos, since the lower 
rate delivers social benefits from the largely beneficial average impacts of 
increased access to microcredit (Angelucci, Karlan, and Zinman 2013), in 
addition to public relations benefits and increased opportunities for cross-sells. So 
a natural follow-on question is why firms (including Compartamos) do not charge 
lower rates to begin with. One possibility worth exploring is that experimenting 
with lower rates is risky: a lower rate may reset customer expectations of a 
fair/market rate, and create a kink in the demand curve. Karlan and Zinman 
(2008) find evidence along these lines in South Africa. If this dynamic holds, then 
cutting rates may reduce or eliminate the option to increase rates in the future 
(e.g., if it turns out that the lower rate was not as profitable as the initial rate). In 
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Low rate High Rate
Difference in Means 
(1) - (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Borrower characteristics
Proportion of clients with high school or more 0.503 0.457 0.046
(0.025) (0.023) (0.034)
Age 40.222 40.191 0.031
(0.226) (0.235) (0.326)
Number of children 3.072 3.183 -0.111
(0.063) (0.064) (0.089)
Number of dependents 1.986 1.970 0.015
(0.037) (0.052) (0.064)
Number of married clients 510.718 518.179 -7.462
(63.465) (47.453) (79.244)
Panel B: Loan volume
Number of clients borrowing this month 858.179 821.385 36.795
(99.863) (69.634) (121.744)
Number of loans 858.179 821.385 36.795
(99.863) (69.634) (121.744)
Number of outstanding loans 2,925.333 2,826.564 98.769
(359.782) (249.812) (438.006)
Number of new clients borrowing this month 192.231 155.744 36.487
(19.161) (10.935) (22.062)
Number of retained clients borrowing this month 665.949 665.641 0.308
(87.198) (62.002) (106.994)
Number of outstanding loans of retained clients 2,337.769 2,341.615 -3.846
(324.065) (228.227) (396.366)
Number of clients with high school or more 395.179 353.077 42.103
(47.786) (31.846) (57.425)
Number of clients without high school 462.051 467.923 -5.872
(61.725) (45.506) (76.686)
Loan amount for all loans disbursed (M$ thousands) 6,064.544 5,924.230 140.314
(840.700) (638.784) (1055.851)
N 39 39 78
Continued on next page
Table 1. Baseline Summary Statistics and Orthogonality
Means and Standard Errors
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Low rate High Rate
Difference in Means 
(1) - (2)
(1) (2) (3)
Panel C: Loan characteristics
Loan amount (M$ thousands) 6.464 6.468 -0.004
(0.250) (0.277) (0.373)
Loan amount for loans disbursed to new clients 716.133 566.186 149.947*
(75.249) (47.316) (88.889)
Loan amount for loans disbursed to retained clients 5,348.411 5,358.044 -9.633
(793.515) (604.132) (997.317)
APR (including VAT, not including forced savings) 97.956 99.673 -1.717
(1.709) (1.967) (2.606)
Number of of members in a group 16.771 16.774 -0.003
(0.282) (0.281) (0.398)
Number of of groups 49.051 48.000 1.051
(5.345) (3.966) (6.655)
Panel D: Market Share Characteristics
Population Density in 2005 288.128 121.176 166.952
(271.248) (113.140) (293.899)
Borrowers Per Capita:  (Number of Compartamos Clients in April 
2007) / (Population as of 2005 Mexico Census)
0.029 0.029 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Market Proportion 1: (Number of Compartamos Clients in April 
2007) / (Number of Borrowers with Comparable Loans  in Official 
Credit Bureau Data in April 2007)
0.154 0.157 -0.003
(0.030) (0.026) (0.040)
Market Proportion 2: (Number of Compartamos Clients in April 
2007) / (Number of Borrowers with Comparable Loans Recorded in 
Circulo Credit Bureau Data in April 2007)
0.985 1.193 -0.208
(0.144) (0.173) (0.225)
Market Proportion 3: (Number of Compartamos Clients in April 
2007) / (Number of Borrowers with Comparable Loans Recorded in 
Merged Credit Bureau Data in April 2007)
0.126 0.137 -0.011
(0.022) (0.023) (0.031)
Market Proportion 4: (Compartamos Loan Balance in $1,000s in 
April 2007) / (Comparable Loan Balance in Circulo Credit Bureau 
Data in M$ millions in April 2007)
339.511 423.418 -83.907
(54.178) (69.709) (88.287)
N 39 39 78
Unit of observation is the region for the time period of April, 2007. Regions are the unit of randomization and comprised of 1-4 bank 
branches. Of the eighty regions in our study, two were not open before the start of the treatment period, yielding a total of 78 regions 
included in the table. Standard errors in parentheses. Each client only have one loan at the time. New clients are defined as those who get 
their first loan ever in that month. Retained clients are defined as those who had already had a loan in previous months. Poverty likelihood 
variables and delinquency data is not available at baseline.  Population estimates are derived from the 2005 Mexican Census. We define 
"comparable loans" in the Mexican Credit Bureau as loans from a Bank, Bank loan PFAE, Credit line from bank, Non bank loan for PFAE, 
Financial non-bank loan for PFAE, Personal finance company, Medium market commerice, Medium market NF service, or Credit Union. In 
the Circulo data, "comparable" loans are those which institutions choose to report as "personal loans". Compartamos loans are captured in 
the Mexican credit bureau, but not in the Circulo credit bureau. For credit bureau data, we only count loans from comparable lenders: Bank, 
Bank loan PFAE, Credit line from bank, Non bank loan for (PFAE), Financial non-bank loan for PFAE, Personal finance company, Medium 
market commerice, Medium market NF service, or Credit Union. All municipalities included in the credit bureau data have 20 or more 
Compartamos clients. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 1(continued). Baseline Summary Statistics and Orthogonality














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  Interest Rate, per region
APR on loans disbursed (balance-weighted) -8.906*** -9.488*** -10.371*** -10.346*** -10.718*** -9.832***
(0.648) (0.662) (0.647) (0.661) (0.624) (0.535)
Panel B:  Loans Disbursed, per region
# of loans disbursed 91.250 175.625 137.750 338.250* 547.825** 236.843
(162.048) (150.950) (182.210) (189.925) (268.420) (177.563)
Point elasticity -0.768 -1.594 -0.941 -2.423 -2.748 -1.672
# of loans disbursed to new clients 52.050 59.475 42.175 114.100** 137.625** 81.361**
(35.154) (40.495) (46.678) (45.468) (64.154) (40.492)
Point elasticity -1.929 -2.119 -1.110 -3.264 -2.857 -2.373
# of loans disbursed to clients with poverty 
likelihood <50%
73.725 77.575 54.175 96.700 158.675 78.325
(114.468) (107.871) (124.477) (125.783) (162.128) (122.653)
Point elasticity -1.775 -1.349 -0.768 -1.446 -1.658 -1.121
# of loans disbursed to clients that have not 
completed high school
43.500 74.450 30.925 125.675 200.575 84.124
(99.627) (89.731) (100.580) (106.095) (137.185) (103.082)
Point elasticity -0.673 -1.234 -0.398 -1.702 -1.978 -1.108
Panel C:  Loan Amount  (1,000s, Pesos), per region
Loan amount for all loans disbursed 1,025.022 1,570.144 1,313.610 2,894.304* 5,206.458** 2,148.340
(1,510.926) (1,414.327) (1,710.615) (1,708.442) (2,413.994) (1,641.733)
Point elasticity -1.148 -1.937 -1.204 -2.873 -3.600 -2.073
Loan amount for loans disbursed to new clients
267.426* 344.698* 208.117 519.000** 653.706** 396.197**
(160.622) (185.945) (214.453) (205.120) (289.629) (185.806)
Point elasticity -2.519 -3.177 -1.340 -3.647 -3.250 -2.875
Loan amount for loans disbursed to clients with 
poverty likelihood <50%
993.061 942.817 907.769 1,175.228 2,064.349 1,061.817
(982.579) (944.380) (1,054.986) (1,034.073) (1,365.948) (1,039.296)
Point elasticity -2.217 -2.352 -1.745 -2.578 -3.328 -2.177
Loan amount for loans disbursed to clients that 
have not completed high school
588.268 760.733 399.053 1,218.071 2,086.077* 898.381
(889.024) (827.799) (902.403) (924.954) (1,218.710) (923.958)
Point elasticity -1.244 -1.742 -0.707 -2.338 -2.914 -1.657
N 80 80 80 80 80 80
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel D:  Proportion of Groups Delinquent, per region, as of end of month
Delinquency [>=1 day] -0.009 0.000 -0.004 -0.020 -0.022 -0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Delinquency [>=1 days] (new groups) -0.027 0.011 0.002 -0.032 -0.024 -0.015
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022)
Delinquency [>=1 days] (groups >75% new 
members)
-0.012 0.001 0.007 -0.015 -0.021 -0.012
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Delinquency [>=91 days] -0.001 -0.020 -0.037* -0.022 -0.011 -0.021
(0.010) (0.025) (0.021) (0.025) (0.019) (0.017)
Delinquency [>=91 days] (new groups) -0.010 -0.093* -0.030 0.008 -0.031 -0.016
(0.020) (0.052) (0.032) (0.039) (0.030) (0.023)
Delinquency [>=91 days] (groups >75% new 
members)
0.005 0.008 -0.029 -0.019 0.009 -0.016
(0.035) (0.035) (0.024) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019)
Irrecuperable loans (M$1,000s) -9.187 0.115 -5.686 -7.512 -0.297 -2.746
(7.371) (3.771) (6.177) (7.990) (15.855) (2.921)
Panel E: Costs, Income, and Profit, per region
Interest Income (M$1,000s) 17.758 48.469 82.182 134.231 279.401 83.521
(182.049) (183.752) (213.238) (233.947) (264.322) (202.008)
Total Costs (M$1,000s) 85.001 137.782* 160.505* 159.082* 277.534*** 143.852**
(61.386) (72.432) (81.707) (90.679) (100.866) (71.377)
Profit (M$1,000s) -67.226 -90.340 -78.509 -23.713 1.682 -60.355
(135.851) (130.106) (151.960) (164.550) (184.271) (146.047)
Total Costs (M$1,000s) per # outstanding loans 0.041 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.023* 0.013
(0.035) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018)
Total Costs per M$1000 of outstanding loan 
balance
7.201 -1.633 1.549 -0.524 2.477 -0.030
(12.608) (8.014) (5.877) (4.711) (3.889) (7.023)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80
Regions are the unit of randomization and are comprised of 1-4 bank branches. All loans have a 16 week (112 day) term. The experiment began in the middle of May, 2007.
The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. The complete post-treatment period corresponds to June 1, 2007 to October
31, 2009. APR includes VAT but does not include forced savings (see Appendix Table 1 for more details). New clients are defined as those who get their first loan ever in
that month. Low education clients are those who did not complete high school. Poverty likelihood is calculated using household information about the type of floors, water
source, cooking fuel, phone ownership and whether children go to school or not. Total costs is the sum of all itemized operating costs reported per branch office (salaries,
benefits, bonuses, internal training, external training, and administrative expenses) plus charge-offs and 9.58% (2007,2008) or 6.31% (2009) of the outstanding balance as
approximated cost of funds, accumulated over a month and summed by region. Interest Income is the total income realized from the group lending product per branch office
accumulated over a month and summed by region. Profit is calculated as: profit = (interest income) - (total costs) + (changes in the amount due of irrecuperable accounts).
The latter term is basically recoveries on charged-off loans. The results for profits and total costs are robust to changes in their definitions, such as definitions excluding the
changes in the amount due after an account becomes irrecuperable. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 2(continued): Simple Means Comparisons (Treatment – Control)
Differences and Standard Errors
33
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 199.6** 199.6** 190.2**
(90.21) (93.12) (82.59)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 91.15* 95.63* 81.79
(52.89) (55.85) (51.05)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 221.8** 218.1** 211.7**
(106.2) (109.3) (97.03)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 406.7** 403.0** 396.6**
(165.9) (167.1) (155.3)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.063 0.080 0.058
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.010 0.009 0.009
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.020 0.022 0.018





Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -1.41 -1.41 -1.34
Point elasticity year 1 -0.79 -0.83 -0.71
Point elasticity year 2 -1.47 -1.45 -1.40
Point elasticity year 3 -2.22 -2.20 -2.16
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
Table 3. Number of Loans Disbursed (full sample)
885.81
1246.21
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of
observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level.
Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of
the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and April 2007. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 44.73 45.02 31.74
(30.05) (29.44) (28.29)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 18.67 19.67 5.443
(19.78) (19.29) (19.95)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 51.34 51.01 38.39
(35.80) (35.10) (33.71)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 91.38* 91.05* 78.43*
(50.45) (49.43) (47.07)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.167 0.177 0.154
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.061 0.057 0.057
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.058 0.059 0.053
P-value: Treatment (new clients=old clients) 0.134 0.151 0.664
P-value: Treatment*1year (new clients=old clients) 0.230 0.237 0.123
P-value: Treatment*2year (new clients=old clients) 0.185 0.211 0.109
P-value: Treatment*3year (new clients=old clients) 0.097 0.105 0.056





Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -1.30 -1.31 -0.92
Point elasticity year 1 -0.71 -0.75 -0.21
Point elasticity year 2 -1.36 -1.35 -1.01
Point elasticity year 3 -2.03 -2.02 -1.74
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
184.89
301.44
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans for new clients on the variables shown or summarized in the
rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the
region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in
the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and
April 2007. New clients are defined as those who get their first loan ever in that month. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%.
Table 4a. Pricing as Targeting: Do Lower Rates Improve Outreach? Loans Disbursed to New Clients
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 75.07 75.42 81.68*
(46.19) (47.84) (44.70)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 40.46 43.10 47.20
(30.53) (31.96) (30.70)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 78.75 77.32 85.08
(54.21) (56.13) (52.25)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 149.3* 147.9* 155.6**
(77.76) (78.49) (74.73)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.262 0.317 0.256
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.021 0.019 0.019
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.068 0.077 0.064
P-value: Treatment (high educ= low educ) 0.473 0.488 0.731
P-value: Treatment*1year (high educ=low educ) 0.797 0.820 0.672
P-value: Treatment*2year (high educ=low educ) 0.432 0.454 0.627
P-value: Treatment*3year (high educ=low educ) 0.394 0.398 0.494





Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -0.99 -0.99 -1.08
Point elasticity year 1 -0.79 -0.84 -0.92
Point elasticity year 2 -1.12 -1.10 -1.21
Point elasticity year 3 -1.67 -1.66 -1.74
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
494.57
667.87
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans for clients with low education on the variables shown or
summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow
for clustering at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the
experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment
months are March and April 2007. Clients with low education are defined as those who did not complete high school. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 4b. Pricing as Targeting: Do Lower Rates Improve Outreach? Loans Disbursed to Clients with Low Education
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(1) (2)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 79.63
(122.7)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 58.16
(107.9)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 84.43
(130.0)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 119.3
(146.3)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.416
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.200
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.260
P-value: Treatment (high povlik= low povlik) 0.624
P-value: Treatment*1year (high povlik=low povlik) 0.924
P-value: Treatment*2year (high povlik=low povlik) 0.605
P-value: Treatment*3year (high povlik=low povlik) 0.358
Treatment effect estimated by: Low Low*Year
Control for low interest rate branch n n
Fixed effects for month-year y y
Fixed effects for region n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-treatment months (March 
& April 2007) n n
Includes pre-treatment observations n n
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment period)
Point elasticity -1.14
Point elasticity year 1 -0.97
Point elasticity year 2 -1.14
Point elasticity year 3 -1.42
N
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans for clients with high poverty likelihood on the variables
shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard
errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is
excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31,
2009. Pre-treatment months are March and April 2007. Poverty likelihood is calculated using household information about the
type of floors, water source, cooking fuel, phone ownership and whether children go to school or not. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
614.486
2,313
Table 4c. Pricing as Targeting: Do Lower Rates Improve Outreach?  Loans Disbursd to Clients with High Poverty Likelihood 
(>=50%)
37
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 1,979** 1,960** 1,920***
(759.4) (777.3) (640.4)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 984.0** 1,006** 930.3**
(453.8) (469.8) (433.5)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 2,187** 2,135** 2,120***
(897.8) (916.7) (754.2)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 3,865*** 3,813*** 3,798***
(1,370) (1,378) (1,216)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.040 0.054 0.038
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.004 0.003 0.003
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.010 0.012 0.009





Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -1.91 -1.89 -1.85
Point elasticity year 1 -1.15 -1.18 -1.09
Point elasticity year 2 -1.99 -1.94 -1.93
Point elasticity year 3 -2.91 -2.87 -2.86
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of loan amount on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is
the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was
implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for
the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and April 2007. Loan amounts are in Mexican pesos
($1,000s).  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
6450.85
9115.72
Table 5. Loan Amount Disbursed (in M$1,000s)
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Dependent Variable: Number of Loans Number of Loans Number of Loans 
Data source: Circulo Bureau Official Bureau Compartamos
Data includes Compartamos?: No Yes
(1) (2) (3)
Post 12,232*** 70,837*** 1,992***
(1,801) (8,862) (280.5)
Low Interest Rate 1,708 28,787 148.3
(1,180) (35,077) (520.3)
Post*Low Interest Rate 4,440 18,889 788.3*
(3,101) (15,096) (427.0)
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (pre 
and post treatment period) 10,694.52 136,778.24 4,382.48
Point Elasticity -3.65 -1.21 -1.58
N 158 158 158
Table 6. Does the Compartamos Demand Increase Crowd-out Other Borrowing?
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of 
observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. All 
municipalities included in this analysis have 20 or more Compartamos clients. Pre-treatment data is taken from April 2007 report.  Post-
treatment data is taken from December 2008 report. We only count loans from comparable lenders: Bank, Bank loan PFAE, Credit line 
from bank, Non bank loan for (PFAE), Financial non-bank loan for PFAE, Personal finance company, Medium market commerice, 
Medium market NF service, or Credit Union. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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All groups New groups
Groups >75% 
new members
All groups New groups
Groups >75% 
new members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low interest rate -0.00935 -0.0171 -0.00815 -0.0159 -0.0163 -0.0115
(0.0172) (0.0202) (0.0176) (0.0150) (0.0211) (0.0172)
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions 
(treatment period) 0.142 0.190 0.151 0.098 0.157 0.097
N 2,313 2,312 2,311 2,150 2,066 2,102
Table 7. Delinquency: Proportion of Lending Groups Delinquent
Delinquency proportion (Loan payment late >0 
day)
Delinquency proportion (Loan payment late 
>90 days)
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of Proportion of Lending Groups Delinquent on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit
of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was
implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time
period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009.  No pre-treatment data available. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 64.56 80.26** -44.56
(81.41) (35.96) (54.57)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) -3.495 29.33 -62.45
(53.45) (27.41) (41.95)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 77.54 96.29** -47.06
(96.29) (43.26) (63.39)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 195.5 163.1*** 4.065
(147.3) (57.42) (95.77)







Control for low interest rate branch n n n n n n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region n n n n n n
Includes controls for values of dependent 
variable in pre-treatment months y y y y y y
Includes pre-treatment observations n n n n n n
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions 
(treatment period)
N 2,313 2,313 2,313
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of Income, Costs and Profits on the variables shown or summarized in the
rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering
at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment
started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are
March and April 2007. Total costs is the sum of all itemized operating costs reported per branch office (summed by region)
plus charge-offs and 9.58%(2007,2008) or 6.31% (2009) of the outstanding balance as approximated cost of funds,
accumulated over a month and summed by region. Interest Income is the total income realized from the group lending product
per branch office accumulated over a month and summed by region. Profit is calculated as: profit = (interest income) - (total
costs) + (changes in the amount due of irrecuperable accounts). The latter term is basically recoveries on charged-off loans.
All amounts are in Mexican pesos ($1,000s). The results for profits and total costs are robust to changes in their definitions,
such as definitions excluding the changes in the amount due after an account becomes irrecuperable. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.













Post -7.093 -5.746 -15.713*** -12.658** -1.822 -0.113 8.295 9.415 2.048***
(5.804) (5.988) (5.382) (5.698) (6.397) (6.555) (5.179) (6.915) (0.363)
Low Interest Rate -5.079 -2.795 -7.639 -7.571 -1.444 0.739 -4.666 -3.224 -0.0513 0.297
(8.137) (8.225) (7.904) (7.987) (10.023) (10.089) (10.470) (12.206) (0.100) (0.212)
Post * Low Interest Rate 13.945 10.350 9.671 7.801 12.067 8.822 20.227 18.258 0.241
(10.328) (10.453) (7.166) (7.496) (12.341) (12.411) (27.945) (26.968) (0.624)
Term 0.754 -1.236 0.235 0.584
(0.783) (0.752) (0.992) (2.452)
Term_squared -0.014 0.013 -0.009 -0.012
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.029)
Term_cubed 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Mean of dependent variable for pre-
treatment period 0.769 2.716
N 78 152
F-test: post*low interest rate equals 
negative 10 5.375 3.790 7.535 5.640 3.197 2.300 1.170 1.098
p-value 0.023 0.055 0.007 0.020 0.078 0.134 0.285 0.300
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of Average Annualized Interest Rate or number of competitors on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of 
observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Pre-treatment was collected in May 2007 
(one pre-treatment observation per competitor).   Post-treatment data was collected between April 2008 - January 2009 (one post-treatment observation per competitor).   For 
the pre-treatment data, branch managers were instructed to list the branch's top three competitors and collect the annualized interest rate and loan term for a 4,000 Peso loan.  
For the post-treatment data, branch managers were instructed to collect data on the branch's current top three competitors, as well as the original competitors identified in the 





Table 9. Competitor (Non-)Response
Only Competitors 
Present in Both 
Baseline and Followup
Only Competitors with 
Same Loan Term and 
Present in Both 
Baseline and Followup




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 0.138 0.150 0.134**
(0.117) (0.127) -0.067
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 0.093 0.109 0.087
-0.088 (0.101) -0.065
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 0.157 0.167 0.155**
(0.135) (0.144) -0.077
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 0.199 0.208 0.196*
(0.161) (0.164) (0.100)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.314 0.352 0.288
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.316 0.308 0.308
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.263 0.277 0.243







Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -1.21 -1.32 -1.18
Point elasticity year 1 -0.82 -0.96 -0.76
Point elasticity year 2 -1.38 -1.47 -1.36
Point elasticity year 3 -1.75 -1.83 -1.72
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
Appendix Table 1. Log(Loans Disbursed) : Compare to Table 3
6.46
6.92
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of the log of number of loans on the variables shown or summarized in the rows.
Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the
region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in
the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and
April 2007. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 154.9** 154.6** 153.3**
(67.15) (70.47) (61.86)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 72.48* 75.96* 71.21*
(40.26) (43.54) (38.93)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 170.5** 167.1** 168.2**
(79.75) (83.17) (73.56)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 315.3** 312.0** 313.1***
(124.9) (126.8) (117.3)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.074 0.095 0.070
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.010 0.009 0.009
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.021 0.024 0.019







Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -1.44 -1.44 -1.43
Point elasticity year 1 -0.81 -0.85 -0.80
Point elasticity year 2 -1.51 -1.48 -1.49
Point elasticity year 3 -2.28 -2.25 -2.26
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
Appendix Table 2. Pricing as Targeting: Do Lower Rates Improve Outreach? Retained clients (Compare to Table 4a)
700.92
944.77
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans for retained clients on the variables shown or summarized in
the rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at
the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started
in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and
April 2007. Retained clients are defined as those who get a loan in that month but had received loans previously. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
44
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 124.5** 124.2** 103.6**
(51.09) (51.55) (45.21)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 50.76* 52.61* 29.78
(25.94) (26.83) (27.44)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 142.6** 140.4** 121.3**
(60.65) (60.90) (53.24)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 258.0** 255.8** 236.7**
(101.1) (100.6) (92.19)







Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment 
period)
Point elasticity -1.89 -1.64 -1.37
Point elasticity year 1 -0.79 -0.82 -0.47
Point elasticity year 2 -1.77 -1.74 -1.51
Point elasticity year 3 -2.74 -2.71 -2.51
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
Appendix Table 3: Pricing as Targeting. Do Lower Rates Improve Outreach? Clients with high education  (Compare to Table 4b)
390.67
578.09
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans for clients with high education on the variables shown or
summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow
for clustering at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the
experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment
months are March and April 2007. Clients with high education are defined as those who completed high school. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 154.8
(95.16)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 70.07
(63.01)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 171.6
(107.6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 316.3**
(156.8)
Treatment effect estimated by: Low Low* Year
Control for low interest rate branch n n
Fixed effects for month-year y y
Fixed effects for region n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-treatment months 
(March & April 2007) n n
Includes pre-treatment observations n n
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions (treatment period)
Point elasticity -2.35
Point elasticity year 1 -1.48
Point elasticity year 2 -2.36
Point elasticity year 3 -3.36
N
Appendix Table 4. Pricing as Targeting: Do Lower Rates Improve Outreach? Clients with low poverty likelihood 
(>=50%)  (Compare to Table  4c)
579.687
2,313
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of number of loans for clients with low poverty likelihood on the
variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the
region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The
month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of
June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and April 2007. New clients are defined as those who
get their first loan ever in that month. Poverty likelihood is calculated using household information about the type of
floors, water source, cooking fuel, phone ownership and whether children go to school or not. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 0.190 0.201 0.188**
(0.137) (0.151) -0.074
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 0.126 0.144 0.123*
(0.103) (0.121) -0.072
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 0.219 0.225 0.217**
(0.157) (0.170) -0.085
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 0.276 0.283 0.275**
(0.189) (0.195) (0.112)
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*2nd year 0.197 0.233 0.181
P-value: Treatment*2nd year=Treatment*3rd year 0.232 0.225 0.225
P-value: Treatment*1st year=Treatment*3rd year 0.176 0.191 0.163




* Year Low* Year
Control for low interest rate branch n y n n y n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y n n y n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in pre-
treatment months (March & April 2007) n n y n n y
Includes pre-treatment observations y y n y y n
Mean of dependent variable for pre-treatment period
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions 
(treatment period)
Point elasticity -1.67 -1.77 -1.65
Point elasticity year 1 -1.11 -1.26 -1.08
Point elasticity year 2 -1.92 -1.98 -1.91
Point elasticity year 3 -2.42 -2.49 -2.42
N 2,469 2,469 2,313 2,469 2,469 2,313
Appendix Table 5. Log(Loan Amount Disbursed): Compare to Table 5
8.29
8.80
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of Loan amount on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of
observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region
level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the
middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months are March and
April 2007. Loan amounts are in Mexican pesos ($1,000s).  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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All groups New groups
Groups >75% 
new members
All groups New groups
Groups >75% 
new members
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low interest rate -0.0200 -0.0261 -0.0190 -0.0196 -0.0273 -0.0274
(0.0159) (0.0205) (0.0178) (0.0145) (0.0204) (0.0215)
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate 
regions (treatment period) 0.133 0.196 0.145 0.105 0.186 0.130
N 662,275 138,724 237,287 152,595 36,675 54,198
Appendix Table 6. Proportion of Lending Groups Delinquent, Group-Month Observations (Compare to Table 7)
Delinquency proportion (Loan payment late >0 
day)
Delinquency proportion (Loan payment late >90 
day)
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of Lending Groups Delinquent on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of
observation is group-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was
implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time
period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009.  No pre-treatment data available. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Equation (1)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 71.50 108.5** -36.87
(87.78) (44.44) (70.46)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 3.432 57.32* -54.46
(53.23) (29.27) (57.21)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 84.86 124.9** -39.49
(104.0) (53.58) (78.24)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 202.8 191.7*** 11.63
(158.0) (68.61) (110.9)
Treatment effect estimated by: Low*Post Low*Post Low*Post
Control for low interest rate branch n n n n n n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region y y y y y y
Includes controls for values of dependent 
variable in pre-treatment months n n n n n n
Includes pre-treatment observations y y y y y y
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate 
regions (treatment period)
N
Panel B: Equation (2)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 73.28 106.5** -33.25
(92.99) (44.76) (73.34)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 22.29 95.99* -74.36
(177.8) (57.08) (132.9)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 95.59 159.6** -63.53
(213.6) (79.73) (152.3)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 213.6 226.4** -12.41
(253.1) (92.72) (178.1)







Control for low interest rate branch y y y y y y
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region n n n n n n
Includes controls for values of dependent 
variable in pre-treatment months (March & 
April 2007) n n n n n n
Includes pre-treatment observations y y y y y y
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate 
regions (treatment period)
N















Each column reports results for an OLS regression of Income, Costs and Profits on the variables shown or summarized in the 
rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at 
the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment 
started in the middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009.  Pre-treatment months are 
March and April 2007.  Total costs is the sum of all itemized operating costs reported per branch office (summed by region) 
plus charge-offs and 9.58%(2007,2008) or 6.31% (2009) of the outstanding balance as approximate cost of funds, accumulated 
over a month and summed by region. Interest Income is the total income realized from the group lending product per branch 
office accumulated over a month and summed by region. Profit is calculated as: profit = interest income - total costs + changes 
in the amount due of irrecuperable accounts. All amounts are in Mexican pesos ($1,000s). The results for profits and total costs 
are robust to changes in their definitions, such as definitions excluding the changes in the amount due after an account becomes 
irrecuperable. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 43.18* 1.400
(21.96) (1.027)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 1) 11.35 0.353
(14.73) (0.649)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 2) 53.62* 1.843
(27.27) (1.282)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate (Year 3) 93.91*** 2.828*
(34.98) (1.600)
Treatment effect estimated by: Low Low* Year Low Low* Year
Control for low interest rate branch n n n n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y
Fixed effects for region n n n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable in 
pre-treatment months (March & April 2007) y y y y
Includes pre-treatment observations n n n n
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate regions 
(treatment period)
N 2,313
Each column reports results for an OLS regression Personnel Costs and the Total Number of Account Officers
on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of
randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was
implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the
middle of the month. Post = 1 for the time period of June 1, 2007 to October 31, 2009. Pre-treatment months
are March and April 2007. All amounts are in Mexican pesos ($1,000s). * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%.
Appendix Table 8. Personnel Costs







Total Costs Personnel Costs
(1) (2)
Average number of members per group 2.542 -6.172*
(5.865) (3.612)
Total number of lending groups 4.146*** 1.975***
(0.605) (0.331)
Fixed effects for month-year y y
Fixed effects for region n n
Includes controls for values of dependent variable 
in pre-treatment months (March & April 2007) y y
Includes pre-treatment observations n n
Mean of dependent variable 639.041 296.485
Mean of average number of members per group 16.894 16.894
Mean of total number of lending groups 79.028 79.028
N 2,313 2,313
Appendix Table 9. Costing  (in M$1,000s)
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of costs on the variables shown or summarized in the 
rows. Unit of observation is the region-month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors 
allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 2007. The month of May 
2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Average number of members 
per group and total number of lending groups are flow variables. Total costs is the sum of all itemized 
operating costs reported per branch office (salaries, benefits, bonuses, internal training, external training, 
and administrative expenses) plus charge-offs and 9.58%(2007,2008) or 6.31% (2009) of the outstanding 
balance as approximate cost of funds, accumulated over a month and summed by region. All amounts are in 
Mexican pesos ($1,000s). The results for profits and total costs are robust to changes in their definitions, 
such as definitions excluding the changes in the amount due after an account becomes irrecuperable. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 8.217 0.662* 0.178 17.28
(5.022) (0.336) (0.644) (13.28)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 
(Year 1) 2.500 0.587** 0.491 21.61
(2.847) (0.288) (0.808) (15.85)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 
(Year 2) 9.305 0.680* -0.185 11.43
(5.997) (0.393) (0.808) (16.04)
Treatment effect Low Interest Rate 
(Year 3) 19.22** 0.796* 0.304 21.01
(9.413) (0.441) (0.866) (16.81)









Control for low interest rate branch n n n n n n n n
Fixed effects for month-year y y y y y y y y
Fixed effects for region n n n n n n n n
Includes controls for values of 
dependent variable in pre-treatment 
months y y y y y y y y
Includes pre-treatment observations n n n n n n n n
Mean of dependent variable for high-rate 
regions (treatment period)
N 2,313
Appendix Table 10. Number of groups and members per group
Average number of 
clients per account 
officer
Each column reports results for an OLS regression of the number of lending groups, the average number of members per group, average number 
of clients and average number of groups per account officer on the variables shown or summarized in the rows. Unit of observation is the region-
month, and unit of randomization is the region, so standard errors allow for clustering at the region level. Treatment was implemented on May 16, 
2007. The month of May 2007 is excluded because the experiment started in the middle of the month. Average number of members per group and 
total number of lending groups are flow variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
2,313
345.29
Total number of 
lending groups




Average number of 
groups per account 
officer
20.84
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